






Millar v Taylor as a Precedent for Statutory Interpretation 
It is commonly believed that the rule forbidding recourse to legislative history​[1]​ as an aid to statutory interpretation began in 1769 with the case of Millar v Taylor.​[2]​ Justice Frankfurter’s view is representative: 
In Millar v. Taylor the principle of construction was laid down in words, which have never, so far as I know, been seriously challenged, by Willes J. as long ago as in 1769: ‘The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law; and not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it took its rise.’(Frankfurter, 1947: 540–41)
This claim has been repeated by scholars such as Odgers, Craies, Bennion, Vogenaur (Bennion, 1993: 151; Craies and Hardcastle, 1907: 122; Odgers, 1939: 219; Vogenauer, 2001: 671), and relatively recently by Scalia and Garner, who eloquently restated the basic understanding: "In English practice, a complete disregard of legislative history remained the firm rule from 1769 when it was first announced, until 1992, when the House of Lords changed the practice." (Scalia and Garner, 2012: 369) 
Whilst Mr Justice Willes’ opinion in Millar v Taylor does contain the famous passage quoted above, this statement was an introduction to the legal analysis that followed. The issue did not concern the meaning of the relevant provision in the Statute of Anne.​[3]​ The provision was clear: it stipulated that copyright under the Act would last for a defined period of time which had expired for the impugned work. The issue to be decided was whether or not there had been a common law perpetual copyright prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne; and if so, whether or not the statute had extinguished that perpetual copyright. 
When considering the matter, a few short paragraphs after his now infamous statement, Mr Justice Willes said the following:  
The preamble is definitely stronger in the original bill, as it was brought into the House, and referred to the committee.
But to go into the history of the changes the bill underwent in the House of Commons.– It certainly went to the committee, as a bill to secure the undoubted property of copies for ever. It is plain, that objections arose in committee, to the generality of the proposition; which ended in securing the property of copies for a term; without prejudice to either side of the question upon the general proposition as to the right.
By the law and usage of Parliament, a new bill cannot be made in a committee: a bill to secure the property of authors could not be turned into a bill to take it away. And therefore this is not to be supposed, though there had been no proviso saving their rights.
What the Act gives with a sanction of penalties, is for a term; and the words ‘and no longer,’ add nothing to the sense; any more than they would in a will, if a testator gave for years. Yet, probably, these words occasioned the express proviso being afterwards added; from the anxiety of the university-members, who knew the universities had many copies. The University of Oxford had published Lord Clarendon’s History in three volumes, but about five years before; and had the property of the copy.​[4]​
Mr Justice Wills concluded, based on these and other reasons, that there had been perpetual copyright at common law prior to the statute which was not extinguished by the Act. He was the junior-most judge on a panel of four. His opinion was followed by that of Mr Justice Aston, who concurred with Mr Justice Willes and made further comments on the parliamentary deliberations:
This Act was brought in at the solicitation of authors, booksellers and printers, but principally of the two latter; not from any doubt or distrust of a just and legal property in the works or copy-right, (as appears by the petition itself, pa. 240, vol. 16, of the Journals of the House of Commons;) but upon the common-law remedy being inadequate, and the proofs difficult, to ascertain the damage really suffered by the injurious multiplication of the copies of those books which they had bought and published. And this appears from the case they presented to the members at the time.​[5]​
In a vigorous dissent, Lord Yates stated the following:
After examining the several clauses and expressions contained in it, I can not but conclude that the Legislature had no notion of any such things as copy-rights, as existing for ever at common law: but that, on the contrary, they understood that authors could have no right in their copies after they had made their works public; and meant to give them a security which they supposed them not to have had before. And that this was the idea of the Legislature, is plainly discoverable from the debate before it passed into a law. 
The booksellers petitioned, ‘that they might have their right secured to them.’ The committee expunged that word; and substituted ‘vesting,’ in the place of ‘securing,’ (as it had stood in the original bill:) and the House determined the title should be ‘For the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned.’ And afterwards, when the Lords would have struck out the clause restraining the authors with regard to the price, they came to a conference. The Commons said, they thought it reasonable that some provision should be made, ‘that extravagant prices should not be set on useful books.’ And the Lords gave it up. It certainly appeared to the Legislature, that abstractedly from this statute, authors had no exclusive right whatever; and consequently, must be very far from having any pretensions to an eternal monopoly.​[6]​
Finally, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Mansfield, said the following in his concurring opinion: “[t]he bill was brought in, upon the petition of the proprietors, to secure their property for ever, by penalties … . An alteration was made in the committee, to restrain the perpetual into a temporary security.”​[7]​ 
As can be seen from the above-quoted passages, all four judges on the panel relied on legislative history, or in the very least, all of them felt comfortable discussing such arguments in their opinions. If viewed as a matter of stare decisis, Mr Justice Willes’ preliminary statement was obiter. Anyone who read the case without knowing that it had become famous as a precedent for the rule against reliance upon legislative history could easily reach the opposite conclusion--that the case was evidence that judges and lawyers could rely on legislative history.
English judges in the 19th century were aware of the uncomfortable fit between Justice Willes's preliminary statement and the further considerations by the judges in Millar v Taylor. The case wasn't cited by a judge in support for the exclusionary rule prior to 1887, although the case was cited for various procedural and substantive issues throughout the 19th century.​[8]​
In Jefferys v Boosey,​[9]​ in 1854, counsel for the defendant said the following: 
The Judges, in construing the 8th of Anne, in Millar v. Taylor, advert to its Parliamentary history, as brought in to secure copyright, and altered in its progress to destroy it. But without going upon such a ground of construction, it is legitimate to observe, from the statute itself, that it appears to have proceeded from the conflicting interests of readers and authors.​[10]​
The judges, including Pollock CB and Coleridge B, did not comment on this argument although they cited Millar v Taylor as an authority for issues pertaining to copyright law.
The first clear judicial statement indicating that the case stood for the exclusionary rule occurred in Caird v Sime in 1887.​[11]​ In dissent, Lord Fitzgerald, stated that “[t]he rule so aptly expressed has always been enforced in this House. But, strangely enough, Willes, J., does, shortly afterwards in the same judgment, seem to offend against his own rule. He uses language which I quote as not inapplicable to the statute before us.”​[12]​ Lord Fitzgerald proceeded to make arguments based on Hansard: 
The bill as introduced in this House seems to have passed without debate, but in the Commons it met with considerable opposition on the broad ground, that if it was intended to shield public lectures from public inspection, it ought not to receive the sanction of Parliament. ... It ended in a compromise, by which words were added at the end of clause 5 providing that the Act should not extend ‘to any lecture delivered in any university or public school, or college, or on any public foundation, or by any individual, in virtue of or according to any gift, endowment, or foundation, and that the law relating thereto shall remain the same as if this Act had not been passed.’​[13]​
Thus, the first reported judicial acknowledgement that Millar v Taylor stood for the exclusionary rule occurred in order to use the case for precisely the opposite purpose.
It is an equally curious fact that there were perhaps a dozen treatises on statutory interpretation published in the 19th century by such scholars as Dwarris, Sedgwick, Maxwell, Hardcastle, Wilberforce, Endlich, Sutherland and Black, and none of these works cited Millar v Taylor, although all of them, excepting Dwarris, discussed the rule forbidding reliance on legislative history. (Black, 1896; Dwarris, 1831; Dwarris and Amyot, 1848; Endlich, 1888; Hardcastle, 1879; Maxwell, 1875; Sedgwick, 1857, 1874; Sutherland, 1891) The first time that this case was cited as an authority for the rule was in the 1907 edition of Craies' treatise on Statute Law. (Craies and Hardcastle, 1907)
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